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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 16-2388
_____________
ERIK ANTHONY CROOKS-RICHARDS,
a/k/a ERIK CROOKS,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
_____________
On Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A042-170-232)
Immigration Judge: Hon. Mirlande Tadal
_____________
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
November 15, 2016
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: December 21, 2016)
_____________
OPINION ∗
_____________

∗

This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Erik Anthony Crooks-Richards seeks reversal of an April 18, 2016 final
removal order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal of an
Immigration Judge’s (the “IJ’s”) denial of his application for cancellation of removal.
For the reasons that follow, the petition for review will be dismissed.
I.
Because we write exclusively for the parties, we set forth only those facts
necessary to our disposition. Crooks-Richards is a 41-year-old native and citizen of
Costa Rica. He was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1989
at the age of 14. Since his entry to the United States, he has only returned to Costa Rica
once, in 1997, for a two-week period of time. He is a high-school graduate who is
employed at a moving company. He is also married and has four U.S. citizen children.
He is the sole provider for his wife and children. His mother is a naturalized U.S. citizen
and lives in the United States. She is a state licensed child-care worker.
On January 26, 2005, Crooks-Richards was convicted of manslaughter. He was in
prison from 2005 to 2008. J.A. 18. Between 2009 and 2014, he was convicted three
times for driving under the influence (“DUI”). He was sentenced to six months of
imprisonment for the third DUI conviction. J.A. 18. On February 23, 2015, he was
convicted of theft by deception. J.A. 18. Thereafter, he was placed in removal
proceedings and charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) on the ground
that since his admission to the United States he had “been convicted of two crimes
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involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.”
Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 4. On August 6, 2015, Crooks-Richards conceded the
underlying factual allegations and also conceded that he was removable under the statute.
J.A. 15. He sought relief in the form of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(a). On January 6, 2016, the IJ held a hearing on the merits of Crooks-Richards’s
application, at which both Crooks-Richards and his mother testified.
On January 22, 2016, the IJ denied Crooks-Richards’s application for cancellation
of removal. It was not disputed that Crooks-Richards was eligible for cancellation of
removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). J.A. 17. However, the IJ declined to exercise
her discretionary authority and grant his application. In reaching this decision, the IJ
considered Crooks-Richards’s positive equities – “his family and the long duration in the
United States” – and weighed them against the adverse factors in his case – his criminal
convictions. J.A. 18-20. The IJ concluded, “[Crooks-Richards] has not established that
he warrants a waiver as a matter of discretion. The positive equities in this particular
case do not outweigh the adverse factor of his criminal record.” J.A. 20. CrooksRichards appealed the IJ’s decision.
The BIA reviewed the IJ’s factual findings and conducted its own discretionary
analysis. It found no clear errors in the factual findings. In performing its discretionary
analysis, the BIA balanced “the adverse factors evidencing [Crooks-Richards’s]
undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane considerations
presented on his . . . behalf.” J.A. 2. The BIA found that Crooks-Richards’s “negative
factors outweigh[ed] his equities” and, thus, “affirm[ed] the conclusion that a grant of
3

cancellation of removal [was] not in the best interests of the United States.” J.A. 3. The
BIA accordingly dismissed Crooks-Richards’s appeal on April 18, 2016. CrooksRichards timely filed this petition for review.
II.
The BIA had jurisdiction over Crooks-Richards’s appeal under 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), we generally have jurisdiction
to review final orders of removal. However, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) strips us of jurisdiction to
review discretionary decisions regarding cancellation of removal, unless a petitioner
raises colorable “constitutional claims or question of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)
and (a)(2)(D); see also Mendez-Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 428 F.3d 187, 189 (3d Cir. 2005);
Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 178 (3d Cir. 2003). When, as here, the
BIA issues a separate opinion, as opposed to summarily affirming the IJ, “we review the
BIA’s disposition and look to the IJ’s ruling only insofar as the BIA defers to it.” Huang
v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 379 (3d Cir. 2010). We exercise de novo review over the
BIA’s conclusions of law. Mendez-Reyes, 428 F. 3d at 191.
III.
Crooks-Richards submitted an application for cancellation of removal pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). An applicant for cancellation of removal pursuant to § 1229b(a)
must show that he has been admitted for permanent residence for at least five years, that
he has resided in the United States continuously for seven years, and that he has not been
convicted of an aggravated felony. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). In addition, he must establish
that he warrants relief as a matter of discretion. Matter of C-V-T, 21 I&N Dec. 7, 10
4

(BIA 1998). In exercising her discretion, an IJ “must balance the adverse factors
evidencing the alien’s undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane
considerations presented in his (or her) behalf to determine whether the granting of . . .
relief appears in the best interest of this country.” Id. at 11 (quoting Matter of Marin, 16
I&N Dec. 581, 584-85 (BIA 1978) (alterations in original)).
On appeal to this court, Crooks-Richards argues that (1) “[t]he Immigration
Judge’s finding that [he] does not qualify for cancellation of removal under INA
§ 240(A)(c) is not supported by substantial evidence,” Crooks-Richards Br. 9
(capitalizations removed), and (2) “[t]he Board of Immigration Appeals erred in
affirming the decision of the Immigration Judge when the results were incorrect,”
Crooks-Richards Br. 16 (capitalizations removed).
With respect to his challenge to the IJ’s decision, Crooks-Richards argues that
“[the IJ] erroneously concluded that [he] does not warrant a favorable exercise of
discretion and a subsequent grant of Cancellation of Removal because his positive
equities do not outweigh the adverse factors of his criminal record.” Crooks-Richards Br.
12. First, because the BIA conducted its own discretionary analysis, we do not review
the IJ’s conclusion that Crooks-Richards’s case does not merit cancellation of removal.
See Huang, 620 F.3d at 379. Second, even if the IJ’s discretionary conclusion were
properly before this Court, we would lack jurisdiction to review it because weighing of
the equities is a quintessential exercise of discretion which Congress has stripped us of
jurisdiction to review. Crooks-Richards attempts to frame the issue as a question of law
by arguing that “[t]he Immigration Judge committed legal error by abusing her discretion
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and denying [his] application for Cancellation of Removal.” Crooks-Richards Br. 7. He
specifically contends that she failed to consider all of the evidence presented to establish
[Crooks-Richards’s] good moral character. Crooks-Richards Br. 7. He also argues that
she “abused her discretion in denying [his] application for Cancellation of Removal and
her decision was not supported by substantial evidence and she failed to properly
consider the future hardships to [Crooks-Richards’s] four U.S. citizen children and his
U.S. Citizen mother, which would result from his removal.” Crooks-Richards Br. 7-8.
Despite Crooks-Richards’s efforts to cast his arguments of questions of law, his
contentions “amount to nothing more than ‘quarrels over the exercise of discretion and
the correctness of the factual findings reached by the [IJ].’” Cospito v. Attorney Gen. of
U.S., 539 F.3d 166, 170–71 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Emokah v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 110,
119 (2d Cir. 2008)). Under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), we lack jurisdiction to review such
claims, and we will dismiss this petition to the extent that it challenges the IJ’s decision.
Crooks-Richards also argues that “[b]ecause the Immigration Judge made legal
errors in [her] decision by not properly weighing all of the evidence, the BIA erred in
affirming the Immigration Judge’s decision. The BIA was required to give this case full
consideration, and failed to do so.” Crooks-Richards Br. 16. To the extent that CrooksRichards is challenging the BIA’s application of the proper legal standard, his argument
has no merit. The BIA properly reviewed the IJ’s factual findings for clear error and
found none. The BIA then conducted its own discretionary analysis, properly and
carefully applying the standard set forth in Matter of C-V-T and Matter of Marin. We
find no error in the BIA’s conclusions of law. To the extent that Crooks-Richards is
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challenging the BIA’s exercise of discretion, we lack jurisdiction to review such claims.
Accordingly, we will dismiss this petition to the extent that it challenges the BIA’s
decision.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss this petition for review.
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